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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----oooOooo-----
CARRIE M. CARTER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
RAYMOND D. KINGSFORD and 
TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
-----oooOooo-----
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
-----oooOooo-----
STATEMENT OF THE .CASE . 
Case No. 14516 
This is an action by the appellant Carrie M. Carter against 
the respondent, 'Raymond. D. Kingsford, to set aside a 'release of lia-
bility entered into between appellant and a representative of respondent, 
Transnational Insurance Company, and to recover. damages allegedly 
resulting from an automobile accident betWeen appellant arid the respon-
dent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a Complaint on April 27, 1975 seeking to set 
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aside the release entered into between appellant and respondent, 
Transnational Insurance Company, and to recover damages allegedly 
resulting from the accident between appellant and respondent, 
Raymond D. Kingsford. Respondent moved for Summary Judgment 
and this Motion was granted by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist by 
Judgment dated November 28, 1975. Appellant's Petition for Rehear-
ing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was denied by Order dated 
February 18, 1976. Appellant then prosecuted her appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have the Order of the District 
Court granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Carrie M. Carter, and respondent, Raymond D. 
Kingsford, were involved in an automobile accident in Ogden, Utah, on 
April 26, 1971 (R. 17, 114). Mrs. Carter wa~ injured in the acci-
dent and sought. treatJ:nent from her private physician, Dr. David P. 
Jahsman, on the day of the accident (R. 28).· Dr. Jahsman diagnosed 
her injuries as a cervical strain, strain of the left shoulder and super-
ficial abrasions (R. 120). Mrs. Carter was hospitalized on the day 
followi.rtg the accident until June 6, 1971 (R. 28), and was subsequently 
hospitalized again (R. 27- 28). During this entire period, she was 
under the treatJ:nent of her private physician and other physicians who 
assisted her physician by means of consultation (R. 27). On July 14, 
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1971, appellant executed a Release of Liability with a representative 
of respondent, Transnational Insurance Company (R. 112) and 
received the settlement of $3,334.09 (R. 135). Approximately one 
year later, appellant noticed a recurrence of numbness in her right 
arm and sought the aid of her physician (R. ll2). She continued to be 
treated by Dr. Jahsman until November of 1974 when she was seen by 
Dr. C. D. Van Hook (R. 121). Dr. Van Hook discovered that 
Mrs. Carter was suffering from a cervical herniated disc (R. 14). In 
January of 1975 surgery was performed involving a fusion of the C- 5 
and 6 discs (R. 32, 121). 
ARGUMENT, 
POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS RULED THAT A 
RELEASE CANNOT BE SET ASIDE BASED UPON THE 
UNKNOWN CONSEQUENCES OF A KNOWN INJURY 
Reynolds v. Merrill, 23 Utah 2d 155, 460 P. 2d 323. (1969), 
is the leading case in :Utah on the issue of the grounds necessary to set 
aside a Release. The facts of that case are extremely important to the 
disposition of the instant case. That case also involved an automobile 
collision, wherein the plaintiff was injured and sought the treatment of 
his private physician. His physician diagnosed the plaintiff's injuries 
q.s a recurrence of bursitis. Almost two months after the accident~ at 
the request of the defendant's insurance adjuster, the physician signed 
an Attending Physician's Report, wherein he diagnosed the plaintiff's 
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condition as traumatic bursitis of the right shoulder and traumatic 
myositis posterior neck muscles. One month later, the plaintiff 
signed a release and received $655.56. Subsequently, the plaintiff's 
shoulder pains grew more severe and approximately six months follow-
ing the accident, he was hospitalized and tests revealed a herniated 
disc. A spinal fusion was performed resulting in a permanent partial 
disability. The plaintiff then brought suit to set aside the release. 
The trial court held that the plaintiff had lost all rights against the 
defendant by reason of the release and granted a summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint. This court reversed the trial court's 
decision. In doing so, this court distinguished between an unknown 
injury and unknown consequences of a known injury. This court stated 
that the unknown injury can be a mutual mistake of fact and, conse-
quently, can be the basis for setting aside a release. The unknown 
con·sequences of a known injury are only a mis.take of opinion and will 
not provide grounds for setting aside a release. The plaintiff had 
raised a material issue of fact which should have been presented to 
the jury and this was the reason for reversing the trial court's decision 
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. It should be particularly 
noted that in the Reynolds case, the plaintiff's physician diagnosed his 
injury as a recurrence· of bursitis, obviously a preexisting condition. 
Thus, the latter discovery of a herniated disc was quite different from 
the original diagnosis. 
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In the instant case, the injuries suffered by the appellant are 
clearly unknown consequences of a known injury: The appellant's 
physician did not diagnose her injuries as a recurrence of any p're'-' 
e:x:isting condition, .nor did he .make an incorrect diagnosis. He simply 
Was not aware of the severity of the injuries which he did diagnose. ' 
The Affidavit of appellant's physician, Dr. Jahsman, reveals that his 
impression at the time. he first saw the appellant following the accident 
was that she had suffered a cervical strain, strain of the left shoulder 
and superficial abrasions (R. 120). Dr, Jahsman also states in his 
Affidavit that :x:.:. rays and analysis as of 1971 indicated a slight 
degenerative disc disease at C- 5-6, but that he 'was confident that the 
appellant would respond to non-surgical treatment (R. 121). Thus, he 
I: !).' 
clearly knew and so informed the appellant that she was suffering from 
neck injuries and injuries to her shoulder. Appellant states in her 
'' 
Affidavit that at the time she entered into J;he release she was aware of 
the permanent nature of the injury, believed the mjury was merely a 
severe neck strain, but was not aware of the natUre and eXtent of her 
injury (R. 112), What Dr, Jahsman and the appellant did not know was 
the ultimate severity of those injuries. Thus the later discovery of the 
1 -~ • I ' -. !_ : ; l 
I 
degenerative disc and the resulting surgery was not an unknown injury, 
but merely the unknown consequences of the knoWn injuries to the 
plaintiff's neck and upper'back. The appellant's own 'Affidavit in this 
case, and that of her physician, clearly' show that the appellant ha's 
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failed to raise a material issue of fact. Both Affidavits clearly 
reveal that the only thing unknown to the appellant and her physician 
would be the extent of the consequences of her known injuries and not 
any later discovered unknown injury (R. 112, 121). The trial judge 
correctly made this finding. In his memorandum decision, he stated: 
There can be no question that after the 
accident she knew and was informed that she 
had an injury to her neck •••• This is with-
out a doubt a case in which a release has been 
given for a known neck injury, the future of· 
which was speculative, and in the general 
belief that the plaintiff was recovering, but 
that the monies were paid for the risk of 
known recovery. The case is clearly distin~ 
guishable from Reynolds v. Merrill, 23 Utah 2d, 
155, where the injury was not noted and not 
considered in its true light at the time. • • • 
· If a release is good at all this release must be 
recognized. • • • Unquestionably, from Dr. 
Jahsman's report to attorney Keith Henderson· 
in the file, this is a "known injury where the 
result was not foreseeable" and settled on that 
basis. (R. 114-115) 
The trial judge's determination on this issue is correct arid 
this court should affirm its decision. 
" 
POINT II . 'I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS THE PROPER DISPOSITION ' 
WHERE A PLAINTIFF'S OWN EVIDENCE REVEALS THAT 
THERE IS NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT IN THE CASE 
. · As noted above, the respondents in this case are relying 
on the appellant's own evidence to support their position. The 
Affidavits of the appellant and her physician clearly' reveal that the 
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injuries discovered subsequent to the release being executed were 
merely consequences of the injuries known t9 the appellant and her 
physician prior to the time that the release was executed. Thus, the 
appellant has failed to raise a m~terial issue of fact which would pre-
elude the trial court from granting respondents 1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The standard by which a summary judgment by the trial, 
·court is rE!viewed.by this court was set.forth ~the case of Frederick 
May & Company v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P, 2d 266 (1962). That 
case involved a brokerage company suing to recover a broker's 
commission for the sale of a bus~ess concern. The trial court granted 
a summary judgment to defendant and the plaintiff appealed. This court 
upheld the trial court's action in granting the summary judgment and 
articulated th~ following standard to be used in reviewing such a.n action 
by the trial court: 
[1] To susta~ a summary judgment; the · 1 
pleadings, evidence, admissions and infer-
ences therefrom, viewed ·most favorably to 
the lower, must show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, and that the winner 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
, Such showing must preclude, as a· matter of 
law, all reasonable possibility that the loser 
could win if given a trial. 
, This court's affirmance in that case was based largely on 
evidence produced by the plaintiffs, much as in the instant case. Here, 
:·\ 
the respondents. are r~lying on the evidence produced by the appellant 
in her Affidavit. Since those Affidavits conclusively show that there is 
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no material issue of fact, it is obvious that the appellant could not 
have prevailed in a trial. Therefore, the trial court's action in 
granting respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment was correct 
and should be affirmed by this court. 
That the trial court's action was correct becomes even more 
apparent after focusing on the purpose of the summary judgment, As 
announced in Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 269, 351 P, 2d 624 (1960), 
That case dealt with an ac'tion ·by purchasers of interests in oil wells 
to recover damage for alleged fraud and deceit and breach of a 
fiduciary' relationship by defendant, Defendant in support of motion' 
for sUnuniry' judgment produced admissable evidence that purchasers 
were induced to purchase their interests in reliance upon false repre-
sentations made by the sellers and riot by the defendant,. The trial 
court granted the motion for summary judgment and the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed· oh the following basis: 
-- [4] The primary purpos~ ,of th,e summary 
judgment procedure is to pierce the allegations 
of the pleadings, show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, although 'an issue may 
be -raised by the pleadings, and that· the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
:u:· 
[5] It is apparent here that the defendant has 
produced evidence that pierces the allegations 
of the complaint. The plaintiffs have not con-
troverted, explained or destroyed. that evidence 
by counteraffidavit or otherwise. They have relied 
upon their amended complaint and their proposed 
amendment to the amended complaint, 
-8-
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This court went on to say that even though Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is not intended as a substitute for regular 
trial when there are disputed issues of fact, and that summary judgment 
should be invoked with caution; nevertheless, 
• • • where the moving party's evidentiary 
material is in itself sufficient and the 
opposing party fails to proffer any evidentiary 
matter when he is presumably in a position to 
do so, the courts should be justified in. con-
cluding that no genuine issue of fact is present, 
nor would one be present at the trial. 
Here, appellant's own Affidavits have pierced the allegations 
of their pleadings. There is no genuine issue of material fact. 'The· 
evidence is sufficient to warrant summary judgment. It is apparent 
that appellant, having failed to produce any evidentiary matter in 
contradiction of respondents' case, would not.be able to present a 
genuine issue of fact at trial. Therefore, respondents being entitled 
to judgment as a· matter of law, the trial court was correct in granting 
respondents 1 Motion fo!r Summary Judgment and should be affirmed by 
" ·~: ~ ' \ 'j 
this court.· 
CONCLUSION 
tjrl ' ·, 
The District Court was correct in granting respondents' 
Motion for Summary Judgment in that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and respondents are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Appellant's own Affidavits establish that: (I) at the time of 
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the release, both appellant and her physician were cognizant of the 
fact that she was suffering from neck and shoulder injuries; and (2) 
that the injury of which appellant now complains, and by which she's 
attempting to set aside the release, is simply an unknown consequence 
of a known injury. 
This court has stated often that summary judgment is the 
proper disposition where -a plaintiff's own evidence reveals that there 
is no material issue of fact in the case. This court has also ruled 
that a release cannot be set aside based upon the unknown consequences 
of a knpwn injury. 
Based .upon the foregoing, the respondents urge this court 
to affirm the Order of the District Court granting respondents' Motion 
for Sum.rnary Judgment. 
10' 
'' ~ I 
·'·.1 
· RejRct1· ~submitted,- ·' . , 
LV ?,w/J._~ 
D. GAR CH&TIAN' 
J, KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
5 20 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondents 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed three copies of BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT to J. Keith Henderson, attorney for plaintiff and 
appellant, Carrie M. Carter, Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
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